By the second quarter of the eighteenth century, the anglophone inhabitants of the Atlantic world began for the first time habitually to describe their community as collectively British and structurally an empire. This 'British empire' included the United Kingdom of Great Britain (created by the Union of England and Scotland in 1707) and its dependencies within Europe, Britain's insular possessions in the West Indies, and the continental colonies of British North America. Sometimes, though not always, it also encompassed the slave stations, factories and forts of Africa and the East Indies.
benefits. It therefore entailed the rejection of earlier concepts of Britain and of empire that implied particular claims by one of the Three Kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland over any of the others, as well as the abandonment of previous constructions of an empire of Great Britain that was conceived of as inclusive by force rather than by mutual co-operation. The creation of such a demandingly flexible yet precise imperial ideology for Britain and its possessions was the work of two centuries, and was not solely the product of British activities in the western Atlantic, Africa and Asia. The origins of the British empire lay within the Three Kingdoms, though they were necessarily inflected by the experience of American plantation, commercial enterprise, international migration (both voluntary and coerced), and colonial government. 4 It was self-evident to earlier generations of imperial historians that 'Greater Britain' was 'an enlargement of the English State and not simply of the English nationality'. 5 However, the end of empire has inspired calls for a historiography in which 'England' no longer stands so unreflectively as a synecdoche for 'Britain'. 6 The resulting 'new' British history has begun to rewrite the histories of the peoples, cultures, nations and states that have developed and interacted within the British Isles and Ireland. 7 One important outcome of this research has been to draw the history of Britain closer to that of continental Europe, especially in the early modern period, though genuinely comparative studies are still rare. 8 However, it has largely failed to make common cause with the history of the British-Atlantic world, despite the revival of interest among historians of colonial America in the British origins of early American society, culture and politics. 9 The exception to this has been the history of early modern Ireland, though even its historians have been criticized for failing to place Ireland within a larger comparative context. 10 The Anglocentrism of the 'old' British history deflected attention from the history of Scotland, Ireland and Wales; however, the exclusively archipelagic focus of the new British history may enshrine a more expansive, but no less insular, form of provincialism unless it 'extends itself into oceanic, American, and global dimensions', like the British historical experience itself.
11
The new British history is also symptomatic of the larger movement to construct non-nationalist histories of nations. Contemporary political, economic and demographic processes have challenged the traditional narrative of European history as the story of nation-states. International federation, transnational migration and economic globalization have together blurred the boundaries between nations, while sub-state nationalisms have simultaneously challenged the exclusive claims to legitimacy of modern states. 12 It has become easier to see that nations are ethnically hybrid, that states have been constructed in the relatively recent past, and that states which encompass a single nation are as rare as nations that have established their own homogeneous states. The overarching problem of late twentieth-century historiography is therefore how to analyse the importance of nation-states in historical development without assuming either that nations are immemorial or that states are immutable. 13 The nineteenth-century model of nation-states as the necessary unit of historical analysis obscured the fact that those states were as much the products of 'conquest, colonization and cultural change' as the empires they created outside Europe.
14 None of the major European states was either ethnically homogeneous or territorially static: all were composed of diverse peoples occupying various lands. The problems of binding these distinct elements into politically stable communities were ideological as well as practical. Similar theoretical questions had arisen in almost every stage of history known to early modern Europe, from the Biblical union of Judah and Israel, through the Greek confederations and the Roman empire, to the dilemmas of late medieval Christendom. The early modern manifestations of these problems were distinctive only in that they arose simultaneously within both European state-formation and extra-European expansion. Theorists from Francisco de Vitoria in the early sixteenth century to Immanuel Kant in the late eighteenth century wrote with one eye upon domestic political and cultural developments and the other upon European activity overseas. 15 Attention to their theoretical concerns, and the practical policies that inspired them, therefore provides one means to 'embed the history of expansion firmly back into the history of the colonizing nations'. 16 In the monarchies especially, the language of empire provided the means to define the state both as one sovereign body among many within Europe and as the impersonal source of authority within its increasingly rigid boundaries. An empire, in the early modern period, could be defined as an independent polity, as a community of different territories ruled by a common superior, 13 Cf. Benedict Anderson, 'Exodus', Critical Inquiry, xx (1994), with James Clifford, 'Diasporas', Cultural Anthropology, ix (1994) . 14 or simply as an absolute monarchy under a single head. 17 The European monarchies made their initial claims to statehood in the language of impenum, with each ruler equivalent in his own territories to the Emperor himself: their rex an imperator in regno suo. 18 All of the major European states -notably France, Spain and Britain -began life either as composite monarchies or multiple kingdoms. 19 A monarchy in which diverse communities were subordinated to a single ruler was an empire in fact if not always in name, such as the Spanish monarchy after the succession of Charles V to the office of Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. 20 Empire was therefore originally an intra-European conception of the legitimacy and form of a political community; only in the nineteenth century would it become shorthand for extraEuropean 'imperialism'.
21
Empire was a language of power.
22 Throughout Europe, the assertion of imperium and the adoption of symbolic appurtenances such as closed imperial crowns were moves in the aggressive ideological redefinition of monarchy. Scotland and England followed suit in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.
23
The Scottish parliament claimed in 1469 that James III had 'ful Jurisdictioune and fre Impire within his Realme', thereby antedating the Henrician parliament's assertion that the 'realm of England is an empire' by more than sixty years, while the Scottish king adopted a closed imperial crown on his coinage in 1486, three years before Henry VTJ issued a similar numismatic image. 24 These claims may be related to the acquisition of the Orkney and Shetland Islands after the marriage of James HI to Margaret of Denmark in 1468, as well as to James IV's attempts to bring the Western Isles under the control of the crown. 25 The Scottish assertion of imperium was both jurisdictional and territorial; it at once proclaimed the independence of the Scottish monarchy and projected its authority throughout the increasingly diverse dominions that made up the kingdom of the Scots. Similarly, Henry VIII's parliamentary claim to empire in the 1530s was territorial as well as caesaropapal, and was intended not only to assert the independent ecclesiastical authority of the crown but also English overlordship of Wales, Ireland and ultimately Scotland. Accordingly, it can be linked to the two Acts of Union that incorporated Wales into the English crown between 1536 and 1543, to the Irish parliament's declaration in 1541 that Henry VIII was 'King of Ireland', rather than merely its 'lord', and, finally, to English aggression against the Scots in the 1540s.
26
The very language of British imperial ideology -of 'Great Britain', 'empire' and 'colony' -was not forged originally in Ireland, the Caribbean or the Americas, but sprang instead from Anglo-Scottish relations in the late 1540s. The succession of the infant Queen Mary to the Scottish throne in 1542 and the renewal of the 'Auld Alliance' between France and Scotland raised the possibility for both Henry VIII and the regents of Edward VI that England could be encircled by its historic enemies. In the interests of security and honour, both attempted to defuse the threat from Scotland by means of a dynastic marriage between Mary and Edward, enforced if necessary by military invasion. In order to justify this 'Rough Wooing', the English argued that dynastic union would restore the ancient submission of the Scots to the suzerainty of the English crown, and recalled that Scotland had been a dependency of England as far back as the period following the death of Brutus, the mythical Trojan conqueror of Britain. 27 When the Protector, the duke of Somerset, renewed military action against the Scots in 1547 and 1548, his pamphleteers turned to the early British history 'to prove that al Britayn, was under one Emperor, and beeyng under one Emperor, then was Scotlande and Englande but one Empire'. In light of these ancient historic claims, they argued that the Scots should submit to their feudal superiors, and 'laie doune their weapons, thus rashely received, to fight against the mother of their awne nacion: I mean this realme now called Englande the onely supreme seat of thempire of greate Briteigne'. 28 The Scots took this to mean that the English sought 'to preve that Scotland vas ane colone of ingland quhen it vas fyrst inhabit'. 29 This was the first vernacular use in Britain of the term 'colony' to mean a settlement from a parent state in a foreign country, 30 and implied that the Scots were both ethnically and politically a dependency of England within a feudal 'empire of Great Britain'. Though the English claimed that Great Britain was 'no new name but the old to them both', the Scots took the title to imply their inferiority within a composite monarchy. In so far as the Scots would be but a province, or even a colony within 'one sole Monarchie,. . . called Britayn', they had to resist such an unequal conception of both Britain and of empire in the interests of their own autonomy.
31
The idea of an empire within Britain, used in the reign of Edward VI, antedated by two decades the earnest usage of the precise term 'British empire ' James V also headed an expedition to the Isles in 1540, 'to circumnavigate Scotland and reduce the fierce spirit of the islanders to the obedience of the laws'. 39 This beating of the bounds of the kingdom by the monarch became a traditional expression of the crown's continuing assertion of imperium; it only lapsed when James VI became the first Scottish king for a century not to circumnavigate the Isles in person, despite his declared intentions to do so in 1596, 1598 and 16OO. 40 Nevertheless, James did continue the attempts of his predecessors to bring the clan elite on the fringes of his realm within the pale of civility by means of pledges of security, military containment and cultural aggression against his Gaelic subjects.
41
The Scottish crown couched its claims to authority over its dependencies in the language of civility and barbarism. The prevalence of this language in early modern Scotland weakens the claim that it was characteristic of a distinctively English 'imperialist' mentality which had first been developed in the twelfth century at the expense of England's Celtic neighbours; 42 in this context it is also worth recalling that John Mair, the first European theorist to apply Aristotle's theory of natural slavery to the 37 American Indians, was a Scot.
43 A similar division between civility and savagery had been generated in Scotland, and was likewise mapped onto the divide between Celtic and non-Celtic, not least by Mair himself. 44 Scotland's premier colonial theorist, James VI, used just such language from the 1590s in relation both to the Western Isles and, later, to Ulster. Advising his infant son, Henry, in 1599, he recommended 'planting Colonies among [the Islanders] of answerable In-lands subjects, that within short time may reforme and civilize the best inclined among them; rooting out or transporting the barbarous and stubborne sort, and planting civilitie in their rooms'. 45 Two attempts in 1598-1600 and 1605-6 to colonize the island of Lewis with lowland adventurers failed; thereafter, more aggressive means were urged to pacify the Isles by main force, and to suppress the 'wilde savaiges voide of Godis feare and our obedience'. 46 Expeditions in 1596, 1599, 1605 and 1607 culminated in two successive civilizing missions in 1608-9 -one military, the other religious -under the leadership of Andrew Stewart, Lord Ochiltree (who had earlier operated a judicial commission in the Anglo-Scottish Borders), and Andrew Knox, the bishop of the Isles. Ochiltree imprisoned island chiefs and appointed outside commissioners, from whom he demanded strategies to civilize the Isles. 47 The Statutes of Icolmkill (1609) legislated to restore decayed religion, encourage hospitality, discourage idleness, begging, drunkenness and the keeping of firearms, and thereby remedy the 'grite crueltie and inhumane barbaritie', 'ignorance and incivilitie' in the Isles, albeit at the expense of the clans' traditions of sociability and militarism. 48 The regal union between England and Scotland after 1603 43 sharpened these efforts to suppress Scottish Gaeldom. The presumption that James VI of Scotland would be the heir to the throne of England had evidently impelled him to greater efforts of 'civilizing' than might otherwise have been the case and, after 1603, the common enterprise of internal colonization provided both an argument for greater integration between the two kingdoms and the ground upon which a new race of 'Britons' might be formed in Ulster. During the debate over James's proposals for the creation of a unitary monarchy of Great Britain, the Scottish mathematician Robert Pont hailed the reduction of 'this our Great Brittaine, Ireland and the adjoyning Brittish isles . . . to the monarchical obedience of one emperor' and argued that one result of that common obedience would be the taming of 'the wild and savadg Irish of the English dominion, and of the Scottish ilands the Hebrediani'. The shadow cast by the Rough Wooing fell on Pont, as he recalled that the advantages of union had been spelled out almost sixty years earlier in Protector Somerset's Epistle. 49 The Gaels of Ireland and of Scotland had originally been separate problems for their respective monarchs; after the regal union of 1603 they became a single target for the new British monarchy's policies of security and 'civility'.
The fruit of this anxiety was evident in the colonization of Ulster, which James promoted as a specifically British venture, an extension of his policies on the western seaboard of Scotland to be sure, but one in which both his Scottish and his English subjects could participate as equal partners. Francis Bacon echoed James's aspirations when he reckoned that the Ulster plantation was 'a second brother to Union', the first co-operative British enterprise of the newly proclaimed kingdom of Great Britain. 50 James intended the Ulster plantation to provide a buffer zone of civility and stability between the Gaels in Ireland and those in Scotland: 'the people [there] being so easily stirred, partly through their barbaritie, and want of civilitie, and partly through their The majority of the Scottish undertakers were lowland gentry and aristocracy who brought followers with them to settle the lands escheated after the Flight of the Earls in 1607. As an emblem of the co-operative Britishness of the enterprise, the parcels of land offered to Scots and English were roughly equal in size: 81,000 acres in total for the Scots; 81,500 for the English.
The Ulster plantation provided a middle ground for Scots and English alike to pursue common schemes of plantation and 'civilization' in a pan-British enterprise. Its planters were to be the first of a new race of Britons. Their legal identities as Scots or English would be supplemented and, for their children, replaced by their attachment to a new ethnic Britishness, which would not be superimposed upon more basic regional loyalties, but rather serve as a counter-identity to be asserted in opposition to nonBritons, especially the native Irish. 53 The revised articles of the plantation in 1610 called them the 'Brittish undertakers' and the survey of 1618-19 referred throughout to Ulster's 'British families', 'British undertakers' of 'Brittish birth and descent', and their 'British tenants'. 54 From the roots of James's civilizing mission in Scotland, therefore, grew the first 'British' plantations in his kingdoms. 55 The Ulster plantation before 1641 was the most successful fruit of James's efforts to create a united British monarchy, with common British enterprises, in the interests of generating mutual recognition among his subjects as Britons. Nevertheless, there were evident limits to James's vision. The most successful early Scottish planters in Ulster were those from the Gaelic-speaking Borders and the south-west, who were the closest culturally to the native Irish, even though the plantation had been planned as a wedge between Scots and Irish Gaels. 56 Perhaps partly because of this infusion of Gaels, the identification of the Ulster settlers as 'Britons' lasted barely thirty years and was otherwise confined to a handful of James's courtiers in the early years of his reign.
The sheer volume of the Scottish movement to Ulster slowed Scottish emigration across the Atlantic and thereby delayed the emergence of potential 'Britons' in the Americas. Because Ulster provided a more profitable and convenient outlet for Scotland's surplus population, it effectively kept Scottish involvement in North America forty years behind that of the English, and thereby prevented the creation of integrated British settlements across the Atlantic in their formative period. The first half of the seventeenth century saw little disruption in the traditional, continental, patterns of Scottish migration. Before 1641, twenty to thirty thousand Scots may have emigrated to Ireland, a figure comparable to the numbers who went to Scandinavia in the first half of the seventeenth century (estimated at twenty-five thousand), though still smaller than the extraordinary number -perhaps thirty to forty thousand people -who followed the established route of Scottish migration into Poland as pedlars, merchants and soldiers during the same period. Probably less than two hundred Scots went to the Americas before 1640, and perhaps another two thousand joined them in the following twenty years, many under compulsion after Cromwell's victories at Dunbar and Worcester in 1650-1. 66 The convergence of interests that ultimately allowed the English and the Scots to find a common identity as Britons has often been attributed to the absorption by the Scots of English norms to create an 'Anglo-British' identity, based on a common language, political culture, economy and institutions. 67 The beginnings of such Anglicization have been found as far back as the thirteenth century, though it is generally agreed that it only began to take hold culturally and economically from the 1680s. 68 The model of Anglicization is, however, too restrictive. It implies that England was Scotland's only cultural model, when it is demonstrable that the migratory cosmopolitanism of the Scots laid them open to a wider variety of European exemplars, in their colonial activities as in other areas of intellectual endeavour. As Gordon Donaldson stressed, 'the history of Scotland ... is a story of integration in western Europe; and the fate of Scotland was often determined by what was happening in other lands'. 69 The exclusive model of Anglicization also fails to acknowledge the possibility that Scots and English alike could have converged upon similar models, theories and practices, though for different ends, and by different routes. The creation of an Anglo-British identity in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not solely the product of the aggressively active Anglicization of passively receptive Scots; rather, it demanded the concession of Scottish ideas about what it meant to be British and what claims could be made in the name of Britain.
The creation of a 'British' empire demanded that Scots and English alike arrive at mutually acceptable methods of integration. The practice of colonization provided the opportunity for such convergence, since Scottish activity in the Americas before the Glorious Revolution had necessarily drawn upon information and personnel from preceding English colonial ventures. The first tract to encourage Scottish emigration to America, published in Edinburgh in 1620, was written by an Englishman, John Mason; the second such tract, by Sir William Alexander, was not published in Scotland at all, but in London in 1624, which may account for the presence of '60 or 80 English' in Ochiltree's Cape Breton colony. 70 Alexander based his claim to lands in Canada partly on the right of first discovery made by John Cabot when in the employ of the English crown, and on Elizabeth's later grant to Sir Humphrey Gilbert. On these grounds potential English colonists in the 1630s asserted their right to trade and plant in Nova Scotia without a patent from the Scottish crown.
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A proposal in the early 1680s for a settlement on the Caribbean island of St Vincent noted that among the 'Spanish, French, Portugueses, Dutch and Courlanders, as to the English, Irish and others Inhabitants of those parts', only the Scots 'have not some setlement of their owne'. Although the Scottish Privy Council debated the proposal, it was apparently not taken up. 72 The promoter of the East New Jersey settlement, George Scot, attributed his realization that it was Scotland's 'Nationall interest to advance ... the design of a Plantation, hence to America', to conversations he had had in London concerning the English colonies in 1679. His scheme was planted on the basis of a royal grant made originally to English proprietors, taken up by a pan- 70 British group of Quakers, and was deemed to be particularly attractive because it lay 'in the Center of the English plantations in America', which would ensure both its safety and its place under the umbrella of the English Navigation Acts. 73 The East New Jersey colony became the most 'British' of all the plantations to which Scots contributed, largely because of its nondenominational cast; otherwise, Scottish colonial ventures were indebted to English models, but in pursuit of their Scottish investors' and settlers' interests. 74 Seventeenth-century Scottish involvement in the Americas was only contingently related to the notion of an inclusive Britishness. The Scottish courtiers of James VI who followed him to England after 1603 only contributed fitfully to colonizing activities in the Americas. For example, James Hay, first earl of Carlisle, invested in the Virginia, Guiana and New England Companies, and in West Indian privateering, while the second duke of Lennox sank money into the Amazon Company. 75 In the 1620s, New Scotland was the imitative dream of one of the most enterprisingly Anglicizing of all early seventeenth century Scots, Sir William Alexander. He provided a personal link between Scottish plantation in the New World and the early promotion of Great Britainas parallel political, and even apocalyptic, projects. 76 The Scotrish colony of East New Jersey has been persuasively linked to the Anglicizing 'improvers' in Scotland in the 1680s. 77 However, appeals to a larger, British national interest of the kind made to the 'benefite of Great Britane' by Richard Guthry (writing from New Scotland in 1629) were rare: even Sir William Alexander meant Scotland when he spoke repeatedly of 'my Nation' in his colonial tract; and when George Scot referred in 1685 to an earlier 'British plantation' in America, he meant the Welsh Prince Madoc's supposed settlement in the twelfth century. 78 Before the Restoration, the 'British empire' most often referred to the territorial waters around the British Isles as a possession of the Stuart imperial crown. Such an argument was a novelty in seventeenth-century England, at least until it found its first major expression in Selden's Mare Clausum (c. 1618; revised 1635). In the sixteenth century, the English and Scottish crowns had taken opposing positions on the extent of their sovereignty over the seas adjacent to their kingdoms. The Scots, comparatively more reliant on fisheries for food and commerce than the English, had demanded mare clausum in their territorial waters since the thirteenth century; the English in the reign of Elizabeth, especially when opposing the Spanish and Portuguese beneficiaries of the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), supported the opposing doctrine of mare liberum. Soon after his accession to the English throne in 1603, James began to enforce Scottish policies of mare clausum in all of the 'British' seas around the coasts of England and Scotland, reversing the more liberal Elizabethan policies that had allowed foreign access to English waters for both fishing and navigation. 79 The publication of Hugo Grotius's Mare Liberum in 1609 coincided with James's policy of restricting Dutch fishing in British waters, thus putting a specifically Scoto-British argument for mare clausum at the centre of a global argument over rights of dominium. The work, a fragment of the larger treatise De Jure Prada, was published at the insistence of the Dutch East India Company in the context of the negotiations towards what would become the Twelve Years Truce between Spain and the United Provinces. Grotius justified Dutch rights of trade and navigation in the East Indies against the claims of the Portuguese by arguing from natural law principles that anything publicum -such as the air, the sea, and the shore of that sea -was the common property of all, and hence could be the private property of none. The polemical purpose of this was clear: to deny that any state could make the sea an accessory to its realm, and to enforce freedom of navigation throughout the ocean, as a Dutch counterblast to Portuguese claims of dominium over the seas on grounds of first discovery, papal donation, rights of conquest or title of occupation. 80 Though the East Indian context was uppermost in Grotius's argument and provided the spur for its publication, this did not prevent James's subjects from imagining that his claims to freedom of the seas were made at the expense of their own demands for new restrictions on Dutch fishing rights: 'K[ing] James coming in the Dutch put out Mare Liberum, made as if aimed at mortifying the Spaniards' usurpation in the W. and E. Indyes, but aimed indeed at England', noted one commentator in 1673. 81 Indeed, the Treaty of Antwerp (1609) secured Dutch rights of navigation in the East Indies only a month after Grotius's pamphlet was published anonymously in Leiden. The first response to the work came not from a Spaniard or a Portuguese, but from the Professor of Civil Law at St Andrews University, William Welwod, a Scot who had earlier produced the first independent treatise on sea law in Britain. 82 His chapter, 'Of the Communitie and Proprietie of the Seas', in An Abridgement of All Sea-Lawes (1613), supported British fishing rights and mare clausum by answering Grotius's arguments, and was the only response to Mare Liberum to which Grotius himself replied. If God had meant the sea to be free, Welwod argued, he would not have charged humanity to subdue the earth and rule over the fish (Gen. 1:28), 'which could not be, but by subduing of the waters also'. As God had divided the earth after the Flood, so he had divided the sea, which therefore could be distinguished by boundaries, despite its fluidity. On these grounds, princes might claim dominium over the sea around their coasts in order to reserve their fishing stocks to their own kingdoms, even as the wider ocean remained 'mare vastum liberrimum'. 83 At the instigation of Anne of Denmark, Welwod pressed his argument further in De Dominio Mans (1615), in ignorance of Grotius's unpublished reply to his earlier work. 84 Welwod's arguments foreshadowed the Portuguese response to Grotius by Seraphim de Freitas, 85 as well as Selden's Mare Clausum (1635). Selden owned both of Welwod's works and drew on De Dominio Maris when writing Mare Clausum to affirm 'the Dominion or Ownership of the Sea, incorporating the Isle of Great Britain, as belonging to the Empire of the same'. 86 The claim to the empire of the sea was originally a 'Scoto-British' maritime ideology, in which Scottish theories were expanded to justify Anglo-British practices.
The limits of that 'Scoto-British' empire of the seas were soon revealed to the Scots when Charles I reasserted British fishing rights against the Dutch in the early 1630s. The Scottish royal burghs had originally petitioned Charles to prevent Dutch incursions into their coastal waters, to which he responded with a plan for a British fishery allowing English, Scots, Irish and naturalized subjects equal access to all of the waters adjacent to the British Isles. 87 It soon became clear to the Scots that the English would benefit most from such a fishery by gaining access to the Scottish herring-grounds. The Scottish Privy Council tried to enforce a twenty-eight-mile exclusion zone against the Dutch, and restricted Charles's English subjects to half that distance from the Scottish coast. Their attempt failed. The confederation of associations set up to monopolize all fishing, processing and marketing around the coasts of Britain and Ireland collapsed under the impact of local Scottish resistance, especially in the Western Isles, as the Scots objected to being 'confound[ed]' with the English 'under the name of great Britane altho ther be no unioun as yitt with England nor the style of Great Britane receaved there'. 88 They therefore appealed to mare clausum against the invasive claims of the English, just as the English would against the Dutch with the revision and publication of Selden's Mare Clausum in 1635 and (in Marchamont Nedham's English translation) 1652. 89 Selden's work provided the foundation for later claims to dominion over the seas in the name of a 'British empire', though the Scots were right to think that such assertions had been appropriated by the English in the process of becoming British.
In 1654, rumour in Paris had it that Oliver Cromwell wanted to become 'emperor of the seas occidentals ... an old pretension of the kings that were heretofore of England' on the basis of Selden's arguments in Mare Clausum. 90 This echoed claims that would circulate in 1654-5 that Cromwell would become Emperor of Great Britain, or even in one especially extravagant account, Emperor of the West Indies. had been unparalleled since the days of King Arthur, and would not be seen again until parliamentary union joined Ireland to the United Kingdom after 1801. An earlier Protector, the duke of Somerset, had attempted to create an empire of Great Britain by conquering Scotland, but it took Cromwell, another hammer of the Scots turned Protector, to fulfil his aim. Though the title of 'emperor', implying ruler over multiple dominions, was never formally awarded to Cromwell, the rumour that it might be hinted at the new-found status of the republican government within Britain, and within Europe. Only the Holy Roman Empire could have an emperor, since the universalist claims of the imperial title made it necessarily unique. However, this had not prevented a similar rumour from circulating almost a century before, in 1562-4, that Philip II of Spain would claim another imperial crown, as emperor of the Indies. This was a hint that Philip wished to elevate himself to parity with the emperor, since the title had not passed to his branch of the Habsburgs after the abdication of Charles V. 92 In Cromwell's case, it perhaps signified both a desire for equality with the other rulers of Europe and a recognition of the Commonwealth's unique achievement in creating an archipelagic state within the British Isles.
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The Cromwellian conquest of Scotland in 1651 drastically altered the temper of Anglo-Scottish relations for the rest of the century, as the enforced union between 1651 and 1660 had shown that England could conquer and administer Scotland as a dependent province. Meanwhile, the exclusion of Scotland from the English plantation trade under the terms of the Navigation Acts after 1660 motivated economic competition as a means of national autonomy. The Scottish Privy Council began investigating mercantilist means to promote national prosperity after the appointment of James, duke of York, as Lord High Admiral of Scotland, and to this end it proposed a carrying trade supported by the protection of domestic shipbuilding and the expansion of the Scottish fleet. This inevitably implied a challenge to the Navigation Acts though, as Eric J. Graham 1534-1707, 194-206. challenge only threatened Anglo-Scottish relations with the resurgence of English parliamentary mercantilism after 1688. 94 The revival in 1693 of plans for an independent Scottish trade initially made common cause with English merchants who wished to evade the East India Company's monopoly, so that an Anglo-Scottish trading group proposed setting up a joint-stock company. The East India Company compelled its allies in the English parliament to oppose the move, so that the newly founded Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies was ultimately financed solely by Scottish investment. 95 The Company of Scotland offered the profits of a trading factory on the isthmus of Panama, both as the alternative to dependency within the Williamite composite monarchy and as an economic defence against the aspiring universal monarchs of contemporary Europe.
96 'It is the interest and policy of all Governments to improve the naturall product of a Country and to encourage forraign trade', argued one widely circulated defence of the colony: '[t]he experience of all Nations makes appear that nothing contributes so effectually to these ends as forraign plantations'. Scotland's excess population had hitherto been forced to serve abroad as mercenaries and to become settlers in other European colonies or in Ireland, where they flourished, 'but no benefite does accrue to the native Country'. 97 The company's depiction of the potential benefits that an isthmian entrepot would yield for Scotland and the Scots encouraged support from all but the poorest areas of Scotland. 98 The very willingness of so many Scots to invest in such a speculative venture indicated a major shift in Scottish intellectual life by the 1690s. The economic hardships of that decade had led the Scots into their first encounter with the dictates of reason of state and the literature of economic improvement."
In the context of Scotland's historic self-image as an independent martial nation, it took a momentous reappraisal of national needs to acknowledge that the Revolution Settlement had failed to promote Scottish commercial interests, and that those interests were now interdependent with those of every trading nation in Europe. That reappraisal was also marked by a notable shift in Scottish colonial theory. William Paterson warned the Provost of Edinburgh, Sir Robert Chiesly: 'We ought not to think that ever we can bring an Indian business to bear from Scotland only by aping the English and the Dutch'. Yet by using English financial methods to ape the Dutch (and the Portuguese) that is exactly what the Scots were doing. 100 Paterson drew his inspiration for the settlement largely from Dutch models, and he justified it with arguments drawn from English economists, without any reference to earlier Scottish colonial schemes. 101 However, the legal justifications for the colony were not enough to convince either the English parliament or the Spanish crown.
102 Their hostile response destroyed the venture and made it clear with hindsight that the hopes inspired by an independent Scottish colony trade had been misplaced.
The failure to provide a Panamanian pathway to Scottish financial independence drastically narrowed the range of Scotland's political options within the British multiple kingdom. An incorporating union was far from inevitable, but after the battle over the succession in 1703 it became the most likely solution to the problems of sovereignty, national interest and economic rivalry 99 crystallized by the Darien venture. 103 Yet only with hindsight, long after the Union, did the Darien venture come to look like the Scottish 'equivalent of the English South Sea Bubble'. 104 At the time when it was promoted, the arguments in its favour were unimpeachable, albeit over-optimistic. After its collapse, the recrimination and soul-searching it occasioned showed the strength of the national hopes with which it had been invested. Perhaps its most thoughtful epitaph would be Adam Smith's reflection on the effects of 'misconduct' and 'prodigality' in the Wealth of Nations: 'Every injudicious and unsuccessful project in agriculture, mines, fisheries, trade, or manufactures, tends in the same manner to diminish the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour . . . they do not reproduce the full value of their consumption, [so] there must always be some diminution in what would otherwise have been the productive funds of society'. 105 The loss of perhaps one-fifth of Scotland's floating capital in the attempt to colonize a Panamanian swamp ensured that the first Scottish attempt to promote a colonial enterprise based solely on a competitive national interest would also be the last.
The shifting national and international contexts created by the disputed successions to the Spanish, English and Scottish thrones in the opening years of the eighteenth century raised the strategic necessity of incorporating union between England and Scotland, just as it lent the isthmus of Panama a new geopolitical significance. Scottish pamphleteers executed an expedient volte-face in order to persuade the English that it was in their interests to support the Scots and participate in their isthmian venture. Under the shadow of a potential Bourbon universal monarchy encompassing both the French and Spanish dominions, argued one memorialist, the Scots settlement provided strategic and financial defences and the way to 'be ready at hand to seize on Antichrists pouch' (the Spanish bullion mines in the Americas). All of the historic differences between England and Scotland -from the Wars of Independence to the divergence in church governmentcould be smoothed over by the profits of trade, for 'an union of Interest is the likeliest way to procure ane union of affections'. Thus, bound together by economic interest and with traditional dissensions tamed, the advantages of union would be clear: 'we are united under the same crown, and together make the greatest Bulwark of the Protestant Religion'. 106 On similar grounds, the most energetic promoter of the scheme on behalf of the Scots, William Paterson, proposed that a free port at Darien could help to unite the British kingdoms profitably and indissolubly. Under Paterson's new plan for a pan-British enterprise, the Scottish emporium would benefit the AngloBritish imperium: united 'into one empire, whereof England [is] to be the centre country, and London to be the centre city' and, 'by means of these storehouses of the Indies, this island, as it seems by nature designed, will of course become the emporium of Europe'. 107 Paterson's vision of an empire centred on England heralded a conception of a British empire that could accommodate the Scots and the English on equal terms. A monarchy with a single crown, a state with a single representative assembly, and a market with a single metropolitan emporium might safeguard the interests of both England and of Scotland. 108 Yet since the crown was to pass in a line of succession originally chosen by the English, the parliament of Great Britain was to be held in Westminster, and the emporium was based in London, it became clear that this was to be a British empire founded on English terms, though not exclusively to England's advantage.
The standard account of the creation of a pan-British empire in the eighteenth century recapitulates the economic arguments for Anglo-Scottish union. According to this account, the empire provided equal opportunities outside of the British Isles for those -English and Welsh, Scots and Irish -who manifestly enjoyed different positions within the United Kingdom and its dependencies. Britain's internal dissensions could thereby be overcome and the attendant energies rechannelled into a profitable common enterprise. As the later eighteenth-century experience would show, the empire paid. It provided adventurous and talented Scots with a profitable arena for their talents which would otherwise have languished in impoverished provinciality within Britain: 'Investing in empire supplied Scots with a means of redressing some of the imbalance in wealth, power and enterprise between them and the English' and 'enabled [them] to feel themselves peers of the English in a way still denied them in an island kingdom'. 109 The empire therefore provided the consolation prize for the loss of independent nationhood, and relief from the frustrations of provincial marginality.
This perspective on the creation of a 'British' empire is reassuringly pragmatic, but it is also historically foreshortened: because the Scots profited from the empire after 1707, they must have yearned for its spoils before the Union; because being British paid in the eighteenth century, to be Scots in the seventeenth century must have been impoverishing; because the Scots contributed equally to the enterprises of the core after the Union, they must have been creatures of the periphery before it. Yet, these assumptions have to be tested counterfactually. It was, after all, quite possible for the less powerful partners within early modern European monarchies to escape provinciality by enriching themselves through overseas trade. As J. H. Elliott has suggested, 'in the seventeenth century, as "empire" came to include the possession of overseas dominions, Scottish colonization projects in the New World might serve to reinforce the counter-claim to "empire" in its new, more modern sense'. 110 The United Provinces and Portugal both managed to attain or retain their independence from the Spanish monarchy by virtue of the profits of commerce and their possession of overseas colonies. 111 Dutch maritime enterprise expanded into new markets in both the East and the West Indies as a result of Spanish and Portuguese embargoes in Europe, though the founding of the Dutch West India Company only became possible after the conclusion of the Twelve Years Truce in 1621. 112 Meanwhile, the Portuguese revolt in 1640, which ended sixty years of provincial incorporation into the Spanish monarchy, succeeded largely because Portugal's independence was supported by its colonial empire, as a 'kingdom which had lost its independence on the sands of North Africa won it back on the waters of a Portuguese Atlantic'. 113 By the 1690s Scots believed that it was not too late to win their economic independence on the waters of a Scottish Atlantic. Only in retrospect did the failure of their attempt reveal that incorporation would be the alternative to independent empire. The creation of a British empire after 1707 was not simply achieved by the export of metropolitan English norms to willing provincials; rather, it was a process of convergence and comparison, derived from previously parallel experiences of state-formation, colonization, migration and acculturation. Yet convergence was not complete, and its limitations at once diminished the Scottish contribution to the formal norms of the empire and channelled their participation in the Atlantic world. The Treaty of Union created a single imperial market in which Scots and English could trade on equal terms. Yet it also enshrined the separation of the English and Scottish legal systems, and thereby preserved Scots law only for those Scots who remained within Scotland: English law was otherwise the law of the British empire. 'The story might perhaps have been different had one or more of the pre-Union Scots colonies survived; but that was not to be'. 114 Similarly, the resistance to uniting the English and Scottish establishments into a single church for the United Kingdom was symptomatic of the impossibility of creating a unitary church for the empire.
11S Scots would exploit the possibilities of clerical mobility offered by this capitulation to diversity by forming Scoto-British networks for ministers, like those for merchants, educators, doctors and soldiers, within what was otherwise formally an Anglo-British empire.
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Since the mid-sixteenth century, Scots had rightly suspected that appeals to a 'British empire' masked English claims over Scotland rather than the prospect of a union of equals. In order to overcome such suspicions, the British empire had to be ideologically redefined as a community whose benefits could be shared equally by all Britons. That redefinition would be the work of English and Scots alike in the first four decades of the eighteenth century, and would find its most enduring anthem in 1740 in the words of the Anglo-Scot James Thomson's 'Rule, Britannia'. It was only appropriate that it should have been another Scot, Adam Smith, who argued that the British empire before 1776 had 'hitherto existed in imagination only', and that the 'golden dream' promised by the rulers of Great Britain should either be realized or abandoned. 117 The classic conception of the British empire, as Protestant, commercial, maritime and free, lasted barely forty years, until it collapsed under the pressure of denominational diversity, fiscal necessity, territorial expansion and constitutional inequality in the period between the end of the Seven Years War and the British recognition of American independence. Scots helped to make the Atlantic empire British -religiously, economically, militarily and ideologically -and in due course they also helped to unmake it. The resources for both their construction and their deconstruction of the British empire were the fruits of two centuries of Scottish involvement in the Atlantic world.
